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RESUMEN 
El objetivo de este artículo es proporcionar argumentos al debate sobre políticas 
regionales. Para ello, presentamos un modelo de crecimiento endógeno con dos 
regiones e inversión pública. Cuando contrastamos el modelo con datos de las 
regiones españolas, no encontramos evidencia de convergencia, a pesar de que la 
distribución de la inversión pública ha sido favorable a las regiones pobres durante los 
años 80 y 90, y ha existido una considerable movilidad del capital privado. Después de 
analizar otros potenciales factores susceptibles de afectar a la convergencia, 
presentamos algunas recomendaciones útiles para el debate acerca de la redefinición 
de las políticas regionales en España y en Europa. 
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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to add new arguments to the debate on the redesign of regional 
policies. An endogenous growth model is presented with two regions where the crucial 
issue for the removal of regional disparities is public investment. When testing the 
model using data obtained from Spanish regions, evidence of convergence is not found, 
in spite of the redistribution pattern of regional allocation of public investment during the 
80’s and 90’s and a high degree of private capital mobility. After analyzing other factors 
potentially affecting regional convergence, a number of recommendations are supplied 
in order to redefine European and Spanish regional policies. 
 
Keywords: Infrastructures, convergence, growth 
JEL classification: H54, R58. 
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European Union regional policy is becoming increasingly questioned. One of the 
key points in the controversy stems from the maintenance of regional disparities despite 
growing resources allocated to the reduction of territorial income differences. Financial 
resources devoted to Structural and Cohesion Funds now account for over 30% of total 
EU budget; more than twice the share they represented in 1988. However, several 
indicators show a clear exhaustion of convergence in income per capita after the 1970s 
(see, amongst others, López-Bazo, et al. (1999), Rodríguez-Pose (1999), and Sapir et al 
(2004)). To give an example, out of 30 regions which in 1987 were below 60% of the 
EU average income per capita, 83% remained beneath this threshold in 1995 and the 
remaining 17% did not exceed 75% (Overman and Puga, 2002). Moreover, the debate is 
fostered nowadays by the recent enlargement of the EU with new countries who will 
qualify for Structural Funds. And Member States that are net contributors to the EU 
budget are turning down increases in development policies. 
  
  These points lead to a reconsideration of the objectives and instruments of 
regional policies, especially in those countries –like Spain- who presumably will loss a 
significant part of European financing since 2007. Based on the Biehl report (Biehl, 
1986), provision of infrastructures has been a central point to the design and 
implementation of European regional policy during the last two decades. This strategy 
is based on the idea that investment in infrastructures increases returns of private capital 
and labor, involving economic growth in areas where public capital has been installed. 
Relevance of public investment as instrument of regional policy is especially clear in 
cases such as Spain or Portugal, where more than 70% of the Structural and Cohesion 
Funds are devoted to public infrastructure projects. 
 
   This paper aims to add new arguments to the debate on the effectiveness of 
regional policies based on public investment. With this purpose, we present an 
endogenous growth model with two regions (one poor, the other rich) adapted from 
Funke and Strulik (2002). The crucial issue for removing regional disparities in per 
capita terms by other ways than labor migration is a higher provision of public 
investment in the poor region. In such a way, regional policy based on infrastructures 

























































sobjectives of this paper is to check the assumptions and theoretical predictions of the 
model using Spanish data. At this point, we believe that Spain is an interesting case to 
be studied for at least two reasons:  
 
1.  Since 1986 Spain is one of the countries that has benefited most from EU 
regional policy –together with Greece, Portugal and Ireland. Moreover, national 
regional policy was strengthened in Spain since the early eighties. And 
infrastructure investment has become the main tool used in both European and 
national regional policies (Correa and Manzanedo, 2002). As a result, public 
investment over Spanish GDP attained one of the highest scores in the OCDE 
area during the eighties and nineties (Sturm, 1998).  
 
2.  Regional statistics at regional level are better and more detailed in Spain than in 
Greece or Portugal. This fact mainly comes from the intense political and fiscal 
decentralization process happened in Spain, which has boosted the need for 
developing regional statistics. 
 
The main results of the paper are as follows. Our endogenous growth model 
achieves regional convergence under the assumptions of perfect capital mobility and 
redistribution through public investment. Otherwise, regional disparities increase; the 
same would happen if the rich region had a positive, differential access to technology. 
When the model is checked using data from Spanish regions, evidence of convergence 
is not found, in spite of the redistributive pattern of regional allocation of public 
investment. As interregional capital mobility does not seem to have been a real obstacle 
for reducing regional disparities, the implications derived from differential access to 
technology are explored. Our estimates demonstrate that R&D expenditures have grown 
faster in the richest regions. Moreover, if we distinguish between public and private 
investment in R&D, only the latter is positively correlated to initial levels of income per 
capita. Our main conclusion is that regional policies heavily focused on infrastructure 
investment should be opened in order to let more room for other kind of interventions. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the endogenous two 





























































2. A simple endogenous growth model with two regions 
 
Conventional wisdom suggests that endogenous growth models provide enough 
scope for government policies aimed at fostering the growth rate of income per capita. 
While the neoclassical approach usually links the dynamics of income to the existence 
of decreasing returns to scale and exogenous technical progress, endogenous growth 
models define steady-state growth rate on the basis of constant returns to scale and 
without exogenous forces driving transitional dynamics towards a steady-state. Such a 
framework also permits policy-makers to implement policies affecting long-run growth 
rates. 
 
  At regional level, debate on economic growth presents its own features to be 
accounted for. Firstly, the trade-off between efficiency and equity must be considered 
when territorial policies based on public investment are addressed. It means that 
reallocating resources from the most dynamic areas of the country to the less developed 
territories may have a cost in terms of growth. In other words, redistribution may affect 
national growth rate negatively, although a process of convergence could be initiated. 
Secondly, a crucial assumption such a perfect capital mobility plays a relevant role at a 
regional dimension. As is well known, private capital accumulation can be seen as the 
engine of growth. Hence, different assumptions on the relationship between saving and 
investment lead to very different outcomes in terms of growth rate and convergence.  
 
  The framework proposed here inserts these two issues into a theoretical model. 
Some interesting results are obtained about convergence and which factors can be 
identified as relevant by determining it
1. Although they are not documented in this 
paper, the model also provides motivating conclusions on the cost in terms of national 
growth rate that regional policies may cause in line with suggested above
2.      
                                                 
1 An interesting, alternative contribution can be found in Rosello (2003), in which convergence is also 
discussed in terms of social welfare. 


























































Assume a country consisting of two regions: A and B. Aggregate production 
function in each region is given by: 
,
1 α α ψ


















and where ψ is an index of technological efficiency, Git is stock 
of infrastructure in region i at time t, Lit is labor, and Kit is stock of private capital, i = A, 
B. Hereafter, subindex t is dropped for notation convenience. An initial factor 
endowment is assumed to be bigger in region A, so that income per capita Y/L is higher 
in A than in the region B. Note that the specification chosen for the production function 
shows constant returns to scale in private and public capital, and long-run growth is 
possible; moreover, expressing G in terms of L avoids undesired scale effects. 
 
Each region produces a homogeneous output that can be costlessly used as 
consumption good or as private or public investment goods. Firms demand factors in 





































where  i ω is wage rate, δ is depreciation rate of capital, and ri is interest rate. It is 
assumed that there exists perfect capital mobility. Based on that, interest rate parity 
allows us to write: 
δ ψ α δ ψ α


























































































































sWe assume that population (labor) growth is zero in both regions
3. Movement 
equations for private and public capital are given, respectively, by 








where a dot over a variable denotes its time derivative. Ii symbols gross private 
investment, τ is income tax rate, and qi is the share of tax revenues devoted to public 
capital accumulation. Public sector is completed by taking into consideration both non 
productive public spending and interregional redistribution grants: 
() A A A Y x q Z τ − − = 1   (8)
() . 1 B B B B Y x Y q Z τ τ + − =   (9)
Note that non productive public spending ZA in the rich region A comes from decreasing 
tax revenues in the share qA (which goes to public investment) and in proportion x 
(which represents regional redistribution). By contrast, region B has higher resources 
than those corresponding to its fiscal capacity. 
 
Each region is populated by a representative consumer whose intertemporal 




















where ci is private consumption, σ  is inverse of inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, 
and ρ is time preference. It is assumed that utility function satisfies the usual properties 
in order to guarantee a bounded solution. Consumer supplies one unit of labor 
inelastically. Budget constraint of the consumer is: 
() ( ) i i i i i i z a r a c + + − = +
•
ω τ 1 , 
(11)
where  is per capita financial wealth and z i a i is per capita non productive public 












, i. e., households can own financial assets regardless in which 
                                                 
3 This is a consistent assumption with one of the purposes of European regional policies (namely, to 
achieve convergence without a significant loss of population in poorest regions), and with the Spanish 


























































sregions private capital used as collateral is. Maximizing (10) subject to (11) yields the 





















































 is also constant, and thus growth 






= γ  is constant too. As is shown in Barro (1990) for a 
similar model than this one, all relevant variables grow at the same rate so that the 
economy is placed on the steady-state growth path: 
i i i i y Y G K i c γ γ γ γ γ = = = = , where yi 
is income per capita in region i and γx denotes the growth rate of x. 
 
Regarding regional disparity between the two regions, θ is defined as a measure 






= θ ). Note that by initial assumption, θ < 1. Dynamics of this variable 
will depend on growth rates of production factors, especially on regional stock of public 














































− − = = α α
θ
θ
γθ 1.  
(17)
 
Taking into consideration these two assumptions and movement equations for 














θ ψ τ γ . 
(18)
 
Hence, initial regional disparity holds if public investment rates are identical in 

























































sregional policy based on infrastructures and aimed at reducing regional disparities. Let 
us assume that the policy rule chosen by government is given by the following function: 
() () θ f q q A B + = 1 ,  (19)
with   and  . This rule means that an additional investment effort in the 
poor region has to be made until income per capita in both regions becomes equal. The 
effectiveness of policy is clear: if q
() 0
' < θ f () 0 1 = f
B > qA, then  0 > θ γ . As a consequence of this, growth 










> ).  
 
So far we have shown that a simple recipe based on public investment and 
perfect capital mobility may generate convergence between two different regions in 
terms of income per capita. However, the result of convergence achieved in our model 
is very sensitive with respect to some of the assumptions used. Particularly, it can be 
proved that the faster capital mobility and the more efficient capital markets, the greater 
effectiveness of regional policy in removing regional disparities. To see this, let us 
assume that as a result of imperfect capital mobility, private capital is accumulated in 
the poor region B at a rate below that corresponding to its marginal productivity; it leads 
to a break down in interest parity, and a new relation between the relevant variables 















































At this point, it is easy to show that whether qB = qA, that is, whether federal 
government does not redistribute resources in favor of region B through public 
investment, then γθ < 0, and thus the initial steady-state path means increasing regional 
disparities. In other words, to maintain the initial regional inequality requires setting 









µ . Hence, with imperfect capital mobility, a policy rule for 


























































Another assumption that should be considered is the different behavior for 











< ), it is easy to demonstrate that a higher effort in terms of public 
investment in the poor region may not be strong enough to reduce regional disparities in 
per capita terms (see expression (17)).  
 
Finally, a different access to technology for each region could yield an absence 
of convergence. Let us assume that the rich region has a higher level of know-how: ψA > 














































. Also the expressions derived from interest parity and perfect capital 









= . With this expression and assuming again that 


























α < 1, regional disparities increase without regional policy (γθ < 0). Even more, 
policy rules described in expression (19) may not be able to place the poor region on a 
convergence path. In fact, regional policy must follow a different rule to achieve 





⎛ + = θ α f
a
q q A B
1
. It means that a more intense effort to redistribute 
resources in favor of the poor region has to be made when technology differs in each 
region; otherwise, regional disparities remain (or increase) even with regional policy. 
 
In short, the theoretical model predicts convergence in the presence of 
redistribution through public investment. However, convergence may fail if capital 
mobility is not perfect (and regional policy is not strong enough), if the population in 

























































saccess to technology exists in favor of the richest regions. We wonder now if some of 
these results are able to explain the dynamics of growth in Spanish regions over the last 
few years. 
 
3. Empirical Evidence from Spanish Regions 
 
Spain has followed a similar pattern to other European countries in terms of 
regional convergence: a clear convergence in income per capita up until the late 1970s, 
and thereafter convergence came to a sudden stop (Lopez-Bazo et al., 1999). At least 
two facts could be behind this phenomenon. The first is that regional labor productivity 
showed weak dynamics towards convergence in the 1980s and 1990s (Goerlich et al., 
2002). The second is that Spanish regions also became less equal in terms of 
unemployment rates without interregional migration that counterweighed differences in 
regional labor markets (Puga, 2002). In such a way, personal redistribution mechanisms 
-strengthened in Spain since the late seventies- may have contribute to break off 
regional mobility of labor. Most empirical papers coincide by detecting that since late 
1970s, net interregional migration rates in Spain have significantly decreased, becoming 
irrelevant in terms of regional convergence (Antolin and Bover, 1997; Bover and 
Velilla, 2004).  
 
A first look at regional convergence in Spain is provided next. Instead of 
estimating a standard convergence equation we analyze changes in GDP and population 
separately. The aim of regional policy is regional convergence by means of higher GDP 
growth rates in the poorest regions. Actually, getting convergence by means of 
migration could not be taken as a merit of regional policy. After analyzing what have 
happened with both variables, the evolution of most important productive inputs 
(infrastructure investment, private capital investment, R&D expenditures, and human 
capital accumulation) and a critical assumption of our model (capital mobility), are 
examined in order to evaluate the effectiveness of current regional policies, and 
motivate future revisions of them. 
 
A more direct analytical approach might be followed, based on estimated effects 
of public capital on economic growth. However, this choice faces two problems. Firstly, 

























































suniequational frameworks such as convergence equations –with public capital as a 
factor conditioning steady states- and aggregated production functions –with public 
capital as an additional input-. Both procedures are not able to capture entirely the effect 
of public capital on the accumulation of the rest of inputs, mainly private capital, which 
would be the most relevant issue according to the motivation of the European regional 
policy. Alternative approaches such as VAR models or estimates for cost and factor 
demand functions indeed consider the likely complementarity between public and 
private capital, but regional dimension is not properly treated in the former, and results 
in terms of convergence are complex to analyze in the latter
4. 
 
Secondly, as occurs for international samples, evidence of the effects of public 
capital in growth regressions and convergence equations is still inconclusive. While 
papers such as De la Fuente and Vives (1995), Mas et al. (1995) and De la Fuente 
(2003) find significant positive effects of public investment on Spanish regions’ growth, 
other references do not detect any positive impact. This is the case, for instance, of Mas 
et al. (1994) over determined period, Dolado et al (1994) regarding roads and Spanish 
provinces, Gorostiaga (1999) with human capital and endogenous technological 
progress as well, and González-Páramo and Martínez-López (2003) with several 
econometric specifications. And this variety of findings not only depends on samples 
and specifications to be estimated, but also data sources and definitions of variables 
have some influence on the coefficient of public capital
5.  
 
Because of all these reasons, we have chosen a simpler approach to check 
whether regional convergence has taken place and the impact of some issues on the 
dynamics of growth in Spanish regions. In some way, our main purpose is not to test 
directly the effect of public investment on growth, but to study in what extent other 
factors involved in growth processes could be affecting the effectiveness of regional 
policies based on public capital provision. 
                                                 
4 Martínez-López (2001) uses a simple OLG model with regional features to check the effect of public 
investment on the private one. Some interesting results are found supporting the idea of complementarity, 
but implications derived from regional capital mobility are unclear. 
5 Caramés and Lago-Peñas (2000) show this variability in results with data from the 17 Spanish regions 
during the period 1984-1993. In particular, they compare results using data from the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística (INE) (www.ine.es) versus FBBVA (http://w3.grupobbva.com/TLFB/TLFBindex.htm); using 
total private GDP versus no primary private GDP; and using basic econometric specifications of the 
aggregate production function versus those including human capital. Caramés and Lago-Peñas (1999) 


























































GDP AND POPULATION SHARES 
 
Consider the following ratios that measure changes in the share of region i on 
national values of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and population between 1985 and 
1998












































                                                
. Table 1 reports the 
results of estimates when regional shares are regressed on per capita GDP in 1985 
(Spanish mean=100). Data sources are FBBVA (1999) for 1985 and FBBVA (2000) for 
1998.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
In the case of GDP (column 1), shares seem to rise in richer regions in 1985, but 
statistical significance is very low (p-value=0.50). Relationship between changes in 
population shares and per capita GDP in 1985 is neither significant (column 2). 
Moreover, when GDP shares increase more than population shares in poor regions we 
have a convergence process. Combining both changes in population and GDP shares, 
column 3 clearly shows that Spanish regions did not converge during the period 1985-
1998 (p-value=0.77).  
 
Data for GDP from the INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica) have been also 
used in order to check the robustness of results (columns 4 to 6), but they are similar. 
Finally, when the sample is extended until 2003 (column 7), the relationship between 
per capita GDP in 1985 and changes in GDP regional shares is also rejected (p-
value=0.54). 
 
What these results suggest is that regional policy and ex post redistribution could 
have prevented inter-regional migration from the poorest to the richest regions since 
 
6 Empirical analysis uses data from 1985 to late 90’s. When this paper was written, data on public and 

























































s1985, but not changing the spatial distribution of Spanish GDP. Our findings here are in 
line with those achieved by other papers (see, for instance, De la Fuente, 2002).  
 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT 
 
  Summing up, the results provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the 
dynamics of regional growth in Spain has not led to convergence since 1985. According 
to the theoretical model several possible reasons may be suggested. One of them 
requires analyzing the territorial allocation of total public investment since the mid 80’s. 
According to data from FBBVA (2003), the net stock of capital of Spanish regions rose 
substantially from 1985 to 1998. While non-residential private capital grew by 55.3% 
(27% from 1990 to 1998), productive public capital (GP) grew by 82.3%, and both 
social and productive public capital (G) rose by 82.4%
7. Have those figures involved 
significant changes in the spatial distribution of physical capital? 
  











∆= + ⋅ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
+ , 
where the endogenous variable is the accumulated growth rate of different categories of 









                                                
is per capita GDP in 1985
8, and µi is the usual random 
error term. Estimates are reported in table 2. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
  Correlation between per capita GDP in 1985 and the growth rate of public 
capital net stock is negative, especially in the case of productive capital (columns 1 and 
2). By contrast, the relationship between per capita GDP in 1985 and the growth rate of 
private capital net stock is positive (columns 3 and 4). Anyway, parameters are only 
marginally significant in both cases. In column 5 the endogenous variable is the 
 
7 Productive capital includes roads, hydraulic infrastructures, ports, urban infrastructures, motorways and 
airports. Social capital means sanitary and educational infrastructures. 

























































sdifference between growth rates corresponding to productive public capital and private 
capital. In this case, per capita GDP in 1985 is highly significant and negative, which 
means that the ratio 
K
G
 has risen faster in the poorest regions. These results suggest that 
the territorial allocation of public investment (in relation to private investment) has 
followed a redistributive pattern (González-Páramo and Martínez-López, 2003; De la 




  One key assumption of our theoretical model is perfect capital mobility. 
Recalling that if this assumption does not hold, regional policy has to be more intense to 
overshoot forces driving private investment to the most developed areas. Hence a partial 
explanation of the absence of convergence could come from the statement that 
imperfect capital mobility leads to an ineffectiveness of regional policies.  
 
The hypothesis on whether perfect capital mobility across Spanish regions exists 
or not has been checked. According to Feldstein and Horioka (1980), our analysis 
focuses on gross saving and investment rather than figures net of depreciation for two 
reasons. Firstly, gross saving is what flows among regions. Secondly, measurement 
errors concerning depreciation rates would bias parameter estimates. Econometric 
















is the ratio of gross private non-residential investment over Gross Domestic 







is the share of gross regional private saving 
over regional GDP, and Dt is a dummy variable that values 1 in year t and 0 otherwise. 
Individual fixed-effects (αi) and time fixed-effects ( t Dt λ ⋅ ) are included in order to deal 
with heterogeneity. 
 
Data for regional saving have been available since 1991. Moreover, with the aim 

























































s1991, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998. Data source for saving and GDP in 1991 and 
1993 is again FBBVA (1997), and for saving and GDP in 1995-1998 is Alcaide (2003), 
while in the case of investment they were taken from FBBVA (2003). Ratios are 
expressed in percentage. 
 
Table 3 shows estimates aimed at testing if there is no statistical relationship 
between regional savings and investment, as high capital mobility would suggest. Both 
individual and time fixed-effects are statistically significant. Serial autocorrelation is not 
problematic
9. Finally, the potential endogeneity of the saving ratio has been also tested 
using a Hausman test. Corresponding p-value is very high and then the null hypothesis 
of exogeneity is not rejected
10. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
According to estimates reported in column (1), value of  ˆ β  for the whole sample 
is positive and significant but very low (0.10). Moreover, according again to Feldstein 
and Horioka (1980), it should be taken into account that with perfect regional capital 
mobility but imperfect world capital mobility, an increase in the saving rate in region i 
could cause a rise in investment in all regions (including, of course, region i). Therefore, 
perfect mobility would be compatible with low values of β
11. 
 
On the other hand, there is a lack of structural stability of coefficient ˆ β over time. In 
column (2) of table 3 the following specification is estimated 
                                                 
9 Assuming a common AR(1) process with the same  i ρ  and using OLS residuals (ei), the following 

















. The hypothesis of 
common autocorrelation coefficients was verified by using a Wald test. Estimated parameter is low (0.15) 
and only marginally significant (p-value = 0.14). 
10 In order to test exogeneity, residuals from an auxiliary regression (Zit) were incorporated into the main 







t α δγλ ε
−−
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ = +⋅ +⋅ + ⋅ + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
⎜⎟ . Endogeneity is 
discarded when the t-statistic corresponding to Zit in the main regression is not significant. 
11 “The value of β would only be of the order of magnitude of its share of total world capital. The true 
value of β would thus vary among the OECD countries but would average less than 0.10” (Feldstein and 






























































i t α βλ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ =+⋅ ⋅+⋅+ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
µ . 
It includes interactions between saving ratio and variables Dt in order to capture time 
differences in  ˆ β . Corresponding parameter for saving ratio drops over time from 0.22 
to 0. Autocorrelation is not a problem
12. On the contrary, while contemporaneous 





In column (3) Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) to deal with 
groupwise heteroskedasticity are used
15. While results are similar, estimates of 
parameter  β  are lower than in column (2) (0.20 in 1991 and 0.10 in 1993). Finally, in 
column (4) individual fixed-effects are replaced by random-effects. Results are also 
analogous to those shown in column (2). In sum, this battery of results reveals a high 
degree of capital mobility across Spanish regions. In spite of that, the absence of 
convergence is a clear fact for Spanish regions in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Thus, there is a 
high probability that other factors will be probably behind that.  
 
                                                 
r
12 Significance of AR(1) parameter is now very low (p-value=0.29). 










= ∑∑ , where  are squared correlations among residuals 
and the null hypothesis is no correlation (Breusch and Pagan, 1980). 
2
ij r














⎣ ⎦ ∑ , where s
2 are estimated variances using OLS 
residuals, n is the number of individuals and T the number of periods. See Greene (1997). 



























































Regarding differences in the technological level of regions, model in Section 2 
finds another potential cause of no convergence among regions. Because of that, 
relationships between R&D expenditures and per capita GDP have been also explored. 
Using data for regional R&D expenditures over regional GDP from INE (2004), we 







































                                                
 
 
While there is a positive correlation (+0.30) between regional per capita GDP in 
1985 and average R&D total expenditures over regional GDP during the period 1987-
2001, there are two outliers: Madrid and the Baleares. Madrid –one of the richest 
Spanish regions- concentrates a big number of both private and public R&D activities 
because of its role as capital of the country. Madrid is the headquarters of many public 
offices and large private firms with factories located in other Spanish regions. The case 
of the Baleares is the opposite: its high level of per capita GDP is explained by the key 
role played by tourism, scarcely rooted in R&D activities. 
 
  Table 4 shows results from regressing both aforementioned R&D variables on 
the level of economic development in 1985 proxied by per capita GDP. Conclusions are 
quite sensitive to the inclusion of Madrid and the Baleares. In columns (2) and (4) both 
observations are excluded. Attending to p-values and coefficients corresponding to per 
capita GDP, the higher the level of development in 1985, the higher the average effort 
made in R&D activities and the higher the expansion in R&D activities
16. Public and 
private R&D activities are analyzed separately in Table 5. While the level and growth 
of R&D expenditures by companies are positively correlated with the relative level of 
per capita GDP in 1985 (columns 1 and 3), expenditures by the public sector (including 
universities) are not (columns 2 and 4). In sum, the reason for a growing concentration 
 
16 For the whole country, R&D expenditures in terms of Spanish GDP has steadily grown from 0.64 (in 

























































sof R&D activities in richer regions must be found in choices made by private 
companies.  





Last but not least, although the above growth model does not take into account 
human capital, it is one of the most important growth-enhancing factors. While total 
active population in Spain (H1) grew between 1985 and 1998 by 19.4%, the number of 
actives with at least secondary schooling (H2) grew by 135.0%, and the number of 
actives with universitary schooling (H3) rose by 107.7%. And the last two variables 
have tended to increase faster in poorer regions, so that a positive effect on the 
reduction of regional disparities should be expected.  
 
Table 6 reports estimates where the growth rate of human capital is regressed on 
the per capita GDP at the beginning of the period. Although the growth rate of total 
active population is not related to relative per capita GDP in 1985 (p-value = 0.38), we 
find that the schooling of workers has tended to rise faster in poorer regions. See the 
negative sign obtained for per capita GDP at the beginning of the period, marginally 
significant in the case of H2, and significant at 5% level in the case of H3. 
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
At this point, there is awareness that not all potential variables involved in 
growth processes have been analyzed. But on the basis of the above endogenous growth 
model, on the empirical results reported in section 3, and on the body of work on 
growth-enhancing public policies published since the late 90’s (see, for instance, 
Boldrin and Canova, 2001, and the subsequent literature), the optimality of current 


























































s4. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
The redefinition of the European regional policy is on the table. Two issues 
stimulate this debate. On the one hand, regional convergence between recipient regions 
of Structural Funds and the most developed areas in the EU is scarcely significant, as 
has been highlighted by previous papers. On the other, the recent enlargement of the EU 
with new countries enjoying low levels of per capita GDP according to European 
standards. Moreover, purpose of net contributor countries is to not increase the 
Community Budget for financing development policies in favor of the new Member 
States. A more efficient use of the resources for regional policies seems to be then a 
crucial aim for the future. 
 
This paper adds arguments upon this issue. We have presented a simple 
endogenous growth model with two regions, where public investment allows achieving 
regional convergence. This result is sensitive to interregional capital mobility, labor 
migrations, and R&D investment. When the model is checked for Spain over 1985-2003 
we find that the concentration of economic activity in the richest regions has not 
changed in spite of the implementation of regional policies. In addition, private capital 
mobility (very high during the studied period) and regional dynamics of human capital 
accumulation have not been obstacles for convergence.  
 
Two different –but compatible- interpretations of empirics can be made: 
resources devoted to regional policies have not been enough; or regional policies are not 
optimally designed. While Spanish regional policy could compensate cuts in European 
funds (Utrilla, 2004), thinking in significant increases in total resources seems too 
optimistic. Hence looking for a more efficient regional policy seems to be an easier path 
in order to attain a better performance in terms of convergence. 
  
In this way, a number of challenges should be faced by both European and 
Spanish regional policies: 
 
1.  Getting higher levels of efficiency in the allocation of public funds is a priority. 
In such a way, results from detailed ex ante cost-benefit analysis should be 

























































soptimal balance between financial efforts made in infrastructures, training and 
R&D. Moreover, current legal controls on the use of grants by both public and 
private agents are clearly not enough. Ex post controls on the efficiency of 
expenditures in all areas must be strengthened to avoid the refinancing of wrong 
programmes. 
 
2.  A closer integration of public and private investment in R&D to aim several 
objectives at European, national and regional levels. Firstly, to increase overall 
expenditures in this area. According to data from the OCDE, the EU invests 1.9 
per cent of its GDP in R&D; and the percentage falls until 1% in the case of 
Spain. Additional efforts are clearly needed to meet the target of close to 3% 
established in Lisbon (Kok, 2004). Secondly, deficits from the EU and Spain 
with respect to the USA are mainly the work of companies running up not 
enough expenditure. Stimulating private investment in R&D by means of tax 
credits, and converting knowledge into commercially-viable innovation to a 
higher extent are the methods proposed in the Sapir Report to fill the gap
17. In 
this sense, a close look at the relationships between universities and firms in the 
USA could be good input for redesigning European R&D systems (Veloso et al, 
2003). Thirdly, as long as underinvestment by firms is especially dramatic in 
backward regions, regional policy and subcentral governments with powers in 
this field (as in Spain) must pay more attention upon R&D activities.  
 
3. The  Sapir Report also claims an increase in total investment on higher education 
to attain 3% of GDP. In 2000, USA spent 2.9%, the UE 1.4% and Spain spent 
1.3% (OECD, 2003). While the proportion of the active population with 
secondary and higher education has tended to rise faster in backward Spanish 
regions, data from Hernandez-Armenteros (2004) shows that the ratio between 
public resources granted to universities and the number of students is 
significantly lower in the less developed regions
18. The financing of Spanish 
public universities (private institutions are still quantitatively marginal) is based 
                                                 
17 In any case, tax credits may not be a panacea in all cases. While the Spanish tax system is 
comparatively generous in this respect, expenditure on R&D made by Spanish firms are clearly lower 
than the European average.  
18 For instance, the three regions with the lowest per capita GDP in 2002 had the worst ratios. Defining 

























































son grants from regional governments (around 75% of total revenues), and fiscal 
equalization is very strong in Spain at regional level. Therefore, differences in 
per capita public spending are not explained by divergences in the financial 
capacity of regions, but by political preferences on public spending composition. 
Clearly, backward regions must make additional efforts themselves to promote 
economic and social development. Of course, increasing financial resources is 
not enough to improve the quality of education, as shown by Hanusek (2003). 
But implementing reforms aimed at promoting excellence –as claimed again in 
the Sapir Report- is much easier when additional funding is available. 
  
4.  Finally, a worse performance of the labor market is found in poor regions, where 
unemployment rates are higher than in dynamic areas. A closer interaction 
between training activities financed by regional policy and firms seems to be 
necessary to make the matching between supply and demand easier.  
 
Of course, there are other ways to deal with regional disparities. For instance, 
switching the focus of EU development policy from regions to Member States (Sapir et 
al, 2004; De la Fuente, 2004). In fact, the major advancements in convergence across 
the European Union have been in terms of national economies. This solution would 
imply that Structural Funds should be allocated according to national criteria (such as 
Cohesion Funds), and redistribution within countries would use mainly instruments of 
ex post personal redistribution, namely taxes and grants to households. But this solution 
involves agreeing with a higher spatial concentration of GDP, employment and 
population (then voters and political power) in some regions. And it may be very 
difficult to implement in highly decentralized European states such as Spain, with 
strong regional political cleavages and regionalist political parties
 19. 
 
                                                 
19 See Gunther et al (2004, chapter 6) for a discussion on the decentralization of politics in Spain since the 
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Table 1: Changes in population and GDP (1985-98). Regional shares 






































2 0.030 0.005 0.006 0.039 0.008 0.071 0.025 
Obs.  17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
White 
(p-value) 
0.63 0.30 0.38 0.63 0.22 0.62 0.69 
RESET 
(p-value) 
0.93 0.31 0.24 0.93 0.51 0.67 0.93 
Notes: Below each coefficient appears, in parenthesis, the p-value corresponding to standard t-statistic. 
White is the White´s test on the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. RESET is the Ramsey´s test on the 
null hypothesis of no specification errors.  
(*) Using data from the INE for GDP  





Table 2: Evolution of net private and public capital stocks 







































2 0.075 0.129 0.107 0.105 0.224 
Observations 17 17 17 17 17 
White  (p-value)  0.58 0.59 0.52 0.64 0.51 
RESET  (p-value)  0.11 0.13 0.69 0.70 0.14 



























































sTable 3: Regional mobility of private capital 
EXPLAINED 
VARIABLE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 







  0.10 
(0.02) 
















































































2 0.870 0.881 0.876 0.881 
Observations  102 102 102 102 








Hausman (p-value)  0.94       
LM λ  (p-value)   0.30  0.35  
LM (p-value)    0.00     
Notes: All estimates include time fixed-effects. Estimates (1) to (3) include individual fixed-effects. 
Estimate (4) includes individual random-effects. In the case of estimate (3) FGLS is used to correct 
groupwise heteroskedasticity. Below each coefficient appears, in parenthesis, the p-value corresponding 
to standard t-statistic and, in brackets, that corresponding to White’s t-statistic. LM corresponds to a 
Lagrange multiplier test on the null hypothesis of cross-section homoskedasticity. λLM is the statistic 
corresponding to a Lagrange multiplier test on the null hypothesis of contemporaneous uncorrelation of 

































































sTable 4: Regional evolution of total R&D expenditures (1987-2001) 






























2 0.186 0.425 0.071 0.266 
Observations  17 15 17 15 
White  (p-value)  0.04 0.43 0.05 0.43 
RESET  (p-value) 0.65 0.09 0.01 0.81 
Notes: Below each coefficient appears, in parenthesis, the p-value corresponding to standard t-statistic 
and, in brackets, that corresponding to White’s t-statistic. White is the White´s test on the null hypothesis 
of homoskedasticity. RESET is the Ramsey´s test on the null hypothesis of no specification errors.  
 
 
Table 5: Regional evolution of private and public R&D expenditures (1987-2001) 

































2 0.377 0.027 0.415 0.070 
Observations  15 15 15 15 
White  (p-value)  0.50 0.76 0.70 0.17 
RESET  (p-value) 0.10 0.83 0.70 0.99 
Notes: See Table 4  
 
Table 6: Regional evolution of human capital (1985-98) 
























2 0.052 0.135 0.266 
Observations 17  17  17 
White (p-value)  0.47  0.00  0.73 
RESET (p-value)  0.23  0.01  0.01 
Notes: See Table 4. H1 is active population; H2 is active population with, at least, secondary schooling; 
and H3 is active population with universitary schooling. Source for data on human capital is the IVIE 
(www.ivie.es). 
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